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JURISDICTION
This Court granted certiorari on August 14, 2001. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2.
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issue is presented for review in the Appeal:
Under Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127, is a mortgage executed by the manager of a limited
liability company valid and binding on the limited liability company?
The standard of review for this issue, which was decided in the affirmative on Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and affirmed on appeal
by the Court of Appeals, is correctness and no deference is given to the decision of the trial court
or the court of appeals. E ^ , Mounteer v. Utah Power & Lieht Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following portion of the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, codified at Utah Code
Ann. §48-2b-127 of the Utah Code is determinative of the issue on appeal:
Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage or disposition
of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding upon the
limited liability company if they are executed by one or more managers of a
limited liability company having managers.
Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 18, 1999, Plaintiffs sued Mt. Olympus and Jerez, asserting claims against Mt.
Olympus for : (1) declaratory judgment, (2) negligence, and (3) partition. In response, Mt.
Olympus filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Honorable Anne M. Stirba granted Mt. Olympus's
motion, ruling that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127(2), the documents executed by Jerez
were binding upon the LLC. Appellants appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge
Stirba's ruling on April 26, 2001. See Appendix "B." This appeal ensued.
On August 20, 1994, Namvar Taghipour, Danesh Rahemi, and co-defendant Edgar Jerez
(Jerez) formed Jerez, Taghipour and Associates, LLC (the LLC)1. The group formed the LLC to
purchase and develop a parcel of real estate (the property) under a joint venture agreement. The
LLC's Articles of Organization listed Jerez as a LLC member and manager.
On August 31, 1994, the LLC acquired the Property. On January 10, 1997, three and onehalf years later, the LLC through its manager, Jerez, entered into a loan agreement for $25,000.00
with Mt. Olympus. To secure the loan, the LLC through its manager, Jerez executed, and
delivered a trust deed on the Property to Mt. Olympus. Subsequently, Mt. Olympus dispersed
$20,000.00 of the funds to the LLC and applied the remaining $5,000.00 for various loan related
fees. Jerez apparently misappropriated the $20,000.00. As the managing member Jerez owed
fiduciary duties to the LLC. Jerez breached his fiduciary duties and failed to abide by the terms of
his agreement with Appellants2. The LLC, ultimately defaulted on the loan and Mt. Olympus

1

See Appellants' Complaint, Appendix "A"

2

The Complaint alleges that the operating agreement provided that no loan could be
contracted without the consent of all members of the LLC.
2

foreclosed on the Property. Appellants did not at any time offer to repay any portion of the loan
to Mt. Olympus.
Appellants misstate the allegations of their Complaint. Appellants state that Mt.
Olympus, "did absolutely no due diligence of any kind," other than verifying that Jerez was the
manager of the LLC3.
Appellants also state that
Only after the redemption period for the foreclosure sale had
expired did the Appellants learn that the property had been
mortgaged by Jerez to obtain the loan. (Emphasis added).
This allegation reflects the wording from paragraph 23 of the Complaint except the
portion underlined, "redemption period for the." The sale was a non-judicial trustee sale which
has no redemption period let alone a redemption period "after" the sale. See Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-21 et seq. Arguably, the three month period after the Notice of Default is recorded could
be considered a redemption period of some kind. If that is what is meant by Appellants then they
have added an admission that they had knowledge of the circumstances prior to the trustee sale4.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because it is the policy of law to encourage the alienability of property and the free flow
of commerce the legislature has made provisions in Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 for third parties
to rely upon the representation of LLC's managers when dealing with property. There is no
conflict between Utah Code Ann. §§48-2b-125 and 48-2-M27, the former defines the rights
between management and members of the LLC and the latter between third parties and the LLC.
3

This is not supported by the Complaint, is irrelevant and is argument, not fact statement.

4

If that is not what was intended one must question why the words were added,
3

This is not simply a case of first impression but rather a case of only impression that will
affect the rights of only these parties because the legislature has repealed the statutes in question.
The cases cited by Appellants support Mt. Olympus's argument that when a manager acts within
the apparent (in the case stated) and ordinary course of the LLC's business Mt. Olympus could
rely upon the representations of the LLC's manager. Equity also requires that rather than Mt.
Olympus suffering for the bad acts of the LLC's manager the partners of the manager should
suffer because they created the circumstances that made the loss possible— they are the ones that
clothed him in managerial authority, they are the ones that could have limited his authority, they
are the ones that should have been monitoring his activities and their property.
The creation of Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802 rather than limiting the authority of the
LLC's manager, clarifies and expands the manager's authority. Where the Articles of
Organization, the public document giving constructive notice to person dealing with the LLC,
does not limit the manager's authority, the manager may bind the LLC and the documents signed
by the manager, in this case the note and trust deed, shall be "conclusive" in favor of the person,
in this case Mt. Olympus, who gives value without knowledge of any lack of authority. No
inquiry beyond the Articles of Organization was or is required.
Whether under general principles of partnership law, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 or the
new Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802, Mt. Olympus had the right to rely upon Jerez as the publicly
declared manager of the LLC.

4

ARGUMENT
1

11 IE TRUST DEED OBTAINED BY MT OLYMPUS AND SIGNED B \
APPELLANTS' MANAGER IS VALID AND BINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW
4ND APPELLANTS1 COMPIAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
A.

UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2b-127 MT. OLYMPUS COULD RELY
ON JEREZ'S SIGNATURE AS THE MANAGER OF A LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY WITHOUT FURTHER INQUIRY.

While pleading several causes of action against Mt. Olympus, Appellants' claims all
boiled, down to one legal quest n HI i

\\ litlhei iin* limuril linhilih company can escape

responsibility for a mortgage executed by its manager. The Utah Legislature answered that
question when it enacted the Utah Limited Liability Company Ac I, I ''tali < 'niL

"\I,III

f;4K-"1v I '"7

specifically states in pai t:
Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage or disposition
of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding upon the
limited liability company if they are executed by one or more managers of a
limited liability company having managers,
Significantly, this section of the statute, dealing WID. inc aliLiiat>;iu>
coma..
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• -\* •-•• *MV\ uVd in the articles of organization or

operating agreement" which limitation is the crux of Appellants' argument. That language is
found 01 J 1\ m I a,, v oaw An::. ;•*> -

.: m. ^

..
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. '\

^ ion

commerce5. Certainly had the Legislature intended that limitation apply in the specific context

.'uu^ ' «MIK- lii ins concurring opinion in this case suggests that this result was "not so
much the product of carefully weighed policy considerations as it is the product of legislative
oversight or lapse." However, Mt. Olympus avers that Utah Code Ann. §48-2b~127, the newly
created Utah Code Ann, §4S~2c-8Q2, as well as similar statutory schemes such as Utah Code
Ann. §48-1-6 are, exactly that, the products of careful legislative considerations that facilitate
ornmeree and sustain and promote the longstanding public policy of the free alienability of

5

of mortgages, they would have incorporated similar language in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-1276.
However, when the Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125 in 1992 and again
in 1996 it chose to leave that limiting language out of Utah Code Ann. §48~2b-127. The only
logical conclusion, therefore, is that the Legislature, in the context of documents dealing with
alienability of property, because of their importance to the free flow of commerce, opted for
clarity and reliability of the instrument.
Contrary to Appellants' argument, this reading of the statute does not create a conflict in
the statutory scheme. Legislation often lays out the general case, then prescribes different rules
in specific contexts. We even have a canon of statutory construction that recognizes this
recurrent method of legislating. Where a specific statutory term applies, it takes precedence over
a general pronouncement. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co.. 974 P.2d 1194,
1203 (Utah 1999).
As applied to this statute, that canon of construction leads to the perfectly logical
conclusion that when dealing with important transactions, vital to the economic health of the
state, such as alienability of property, the Legislature wanted clarity and enforceability. It is not
surprising that the Legislature should have made this specific direction in Utah Code Ann. §482b-127 with regard to real estate transactions, while preserving a more structured approach
regarding other transactions in Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125. Alienability of property is regarded
as an essential characteristic of a healthy and robust economy. It is the "policy of law...to keep
6

Appellants' reliance on the repeal of Utah Code Ami. §§48-2b-125 and 127 and the
creation of Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802 is misplaced. Under this new provision the mortgage
obtained by Mt Olympus and signed by Jerez would have been binding and valid. The new
statute clarifies and increases the authority of the manager unless expressly limited in the articles
of organization-a public document giving constructive notice of the limitation.
6

• •. ' .••:: ;r

encourage alienabilm
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property rather than the contrary," Boyle v. Baggs

^(i I',2d 622 at 625 (Utah 1960). See also i apital Assets Financial Servi.es v. Maxwell w - i d
• • "• - ; '• -*)- K V \ . uauih:
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- •. J.kLiL^JA^Iil Associates v. Hercules,

Inc. 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990); Redd v. Western Sav. & Loan Co. 646 P.2d 761 • Utah
1982); Neves v. Wright ().3<S IJ Jd I I V> (I Hall IPM I I! Inr. i nin

IIISUMI IS

liiillui

Legi- ^-i--.- again dealing with this issue and enacting Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802 which stales
in parti
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2), unless the articles
of organization [the public document] expressly limit their authority.., any
manager in a manager-managed company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver
an v document transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal
^erty, and if the authority is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in
lav or of a person who gives value without knowledge of the lack of authority of
the person who signs and delivers the document
(Emphasis added )
In

'

•*'••!

... . - • iuun that does violence to the language employed by the

Legislature. If Appellants' interpretation is adopted an instrument is not valid and binding on the
limited i,aniii!\ /nmpa*

*

. .,

'• • : -*'.1. r * • !• '*ms some

unqualified "due diligence."7 As a matter of law, that is not required.

7

Under such a scheme the lender would never know that it had done enough oi that it
wouiu not be hauled into court on every loan it makes to a limited liability company and the
iihVnabilitv of nmnern would be stymied.
7

B.

CONTRARY TO APPELLANTS' ASSERTION, MT OLYMPUS OWED
NO DUTY TO APPELLANTS IN THIS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE
TRANSACTION.

Central to each of the causes of action pleaded by Appellants is the allegation that Mt
Olympus owed some duty to Appellants to verify that Jerez was not acting outside the scope of
his authority set forth in the operating agreement. For instance, in the Third Claim for Relief,8
captioned "Declaratory Judgment", Appellants alleged:
The [Appellants] are entitled to declaratory judgment that the Olympus Loan and
the accompanying mortgage of the Property and subsequent foreclosure were
invalid because Olympus failed to determine that Jerez [the manager] did not have
the power to take the actions that he did under the Articles and Operating
Agreement of the L.C.
Appendix "A" at ^f 37. In the Fourth Claim for Relief, captioned "Negligence", Appellants
alleged that Mt Olympus owed Appellants a duty which was breached because "Olympus failed
to verify whether or not the managing member could mortgage the corporate property to secure a
debt." Appendix "A" at If 41.
Mt Olympus' Motion to Dismiss was premised on the simple proposition that Mt
Olympus had a statutory right to rely on the signature of Appellants' manager to make its
mortgage valid. In this regard, the Legislature has spoken and unambiguously stated:
Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or
disposition of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and
binding upon the limited liability company if they are executed by one or
more managers of a limited liability company having a manager....
Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127(2). (Emphasis added.)

8

Mt Olympus was named only in the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Claims for Relief.
8

Under this statute, the only thing required for Jerez to enter the mortgage at issue is that
he be the manager of the limited li.abi.lity company. Since the Complaint pleaded that they
selected .lore/ as tin. niitinn'ei ninl In1 ^ as Atimy in thai rapanh Appendix "A" at^f 12, there can
be no facts that deprive Mt Olympus of the statutory right to rely on his signature to take a
mortgage on this property
C

. .
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•_
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)• ^ •<?.

UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2b- 125 DEFINES T H E R I G H T S BETWEEN
MAN AC;EMENT OF H I E LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND I rs
MEMBERS.
•^

K

- -;1 r r , \iiiu ui'dur K \*4 o u — M s

v>h

j t a h Code Ann. §48-2b-

125 which provides that any manager or managing member oi a limited, liability company "has
authority to bii id the Hi i lited. liability coi i lpai IJ , i mless ( v; r^

'•"

i * • • *•

,• -

organization or operating agreement," I Jtah Code Ann, iJ4S-2h-! 25 Appellants position is
simply wrong. That pro \ l^u.r. avUJivsse.-. u^ i;j.n:^ ^ n^^ ,:-. :u.:;.;•• •
liability con lpany and its members. That provision likewise expressly allows the members to,
among themselves, change or limit that authority in the articles of organization or liic operating
agreemei it This allov • s n lembers of the Hi nited liability company to define who shall manage the
company, and provides a member redress against any member or manager acting beyond their
authority.
The provision does not, however, alter the clear statutory language that any manager can
bind the limited liunnity company. i u ( M u J t A ! i L ( N j

.

_

.M, •.

. u. ,;s

( • ^ :_:iie.-1 by Appellants would place an onerous and nearly impossible burden on those
contracting with a limited liability company because it would require that person to inspect and
iv

•

i ._ *<;- - »:•

:, 9

:

n c n is n o t a p u b l i c

record. Indeed, the logical source to obtain the operating agreement would be the individual
representing the limited liability company in the transaction - the same individual whose
authority is in question and who, if he doesn't have authority, has motive and additional
opportunity to deceive. Under Appellants' argument, this may not even be enough. The lender,
if provided with an operating agreement, would have no way to independently verify that it was
authentic and valid. Thus, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125, in part, was an acknowledgment by the
Legislature that it is more efficient and practical that members of limited liability companies
police themselves rather than shift that burden to third parties.
Appellants' contention that Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125 necessarily limits and restricts
section Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127, is contrary to the language of both sections and would
frustrate the obvious purpose behind the clear wording of Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 of the
Utah Code. Thus, Judge Stirba correctly granted Mt Olympus' Motion to Dismiss and the Court
of Appeals properly affirmed.
II.

WHERE JEREZ ACTED WITHIN THE LLC'S ORDINARY OR APPARENT
SCOPE OF BUSINESS, WHERE THE ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION DID
NOT LIMIT JEREZ'S AUTHORITY, WHERE UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2b-127
GAVE MT. OLYMPUS REASON TO BELIEVE JEREZ HAD AUTHORITY AND
WHERE MT. OLYMPUS RELIED ON THE APPEARANCE OF AUTHORITY
AND CHANGED ITS POSITION, NO FURTHER INQUIRY WAS REQUIRED.
Appellants argue that a lender in a commercial loan setting has a due diligence

requirement to determine the authority of a manager to bind the limited liability company above
that required by Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-1279. Appellants argue that this is a case of first

Appellants state that this question is one of first impression in Utah and in the nation.
However, with the repeal of Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 it actually becomes a question of
"only" impression because resolution will affect these parties and no one else.
10

in iHIi ,,-.I<III ,iiid I here fore the Court should look to cases involving corporate and partnership
entities to determine the question in this instance involving limited liability companies.
I he argui net Hi .Hid u I .Hums cmplnvi d Ih Appelliinls b",,>' Ihr (|iii'sli(»n flie cases cited do
not establish that a lender has any legal due diligence requirement. A lender has no such duty. At
most, Appellants use the cases to argue that one claiming to act on behalf of a corporatioi i : i a
partnership must have authority. But nothing in the cases cited suggest that a lender must \ cnty
that authority before loaning money where the public document i>: tin jniii > UUL-S :,*•; .:.;.-:• he
.iiilhf *i 11 s, ^ here Ihr piihln document e\ piessh .mlhiM'i/ed the type of transaction and where a
statute expressly authorizes reliance on the one executing the documents. One must distinguish
between ;i.e icga; . jquiremenl ol due diligence ami Hie meie ^ isdoni iHMuc diligence. In tliL
case, once Mt. O ^ n n u s had reviewed the public Articles of Organization establishing Jerez's
manager status r.i '-une n.eimrv was requii..u.
A

4. CORPORATE RESOLUTION IS NOT 4.1 .WAYS NECESSARY
BEFORE AN OFFICER OR AGENT OF I HE CORPORATION HAS
Al ITHORITY TO BIND THE CORPORATION,

A,';v :.i.

- • ••

*ev,ein 1 ;neigla^o\. ivlituii. .\»^ko:iK.- uiiu bli.-iinc.i, 789 P.2d 34

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) to argue that without a corporate resolution no officer or agent has
authority to bind the corporate,; ,:; a :v.di . ^ L I L JCUI. Western, lio\ve\ei. dull m ill addicss Hi.it
issue but rather a different question of whether ^ nni a law fmn acling on behalf of a corporation
can benefit from I Jtah's indemnification statute Utali L <><\c . urn. c! < ,
corporation.

-< a; j.i age:.. .

;
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The Western Court analyzed not only Utah Code Ann, §16-1 0-4 but three other sections
lining agoni

•' -

ii
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* t•".

personnel who exercise management discretion and who have authority to bind the corporation."
Western at page 39. Western does not stand for the idea that one cannot bind a corporation in a
real estate deal without a corporate resolution and certainly does not stand for the idea that a
lender in a commercial transaction has a due diligence requirement to verify corporate authority.
Rather, it stands for the idea that if one wants statutory protection when acting on behalf of
corporations they must act with proper authority10.
However, there is also authority in Utah that indicates that a corporate resolution is not
always necessary before a corporation can be bound. In Peterson v. Holmgren Land & Livestook
Co. 363 P.2d 786 (Utah 1961) the Court stated that in a family corporation where the articles of
incorporation provided for the purchase of real property and the father/president entered a
contract on behalf of the corporation, that he had ostensible (apparent) authority even where there
were not sufficient corporate minutes authorizing him to act. The Peterson Court quoting 13 Am.
Jur. Sec. 890 at page 871-872 said,
If a corporate officer assuming to contract on behalf of the
corporation is one to whom authority to make such a contract may
be given, a person dealing with him in good faith in not affected by
the fact that the proper steps to clothe him with such authority were
not taken.
Id. at page 788. See also Amoss v. Bennion 420 P.2d 47 at 49 (Utah 1966).

The Western Court as dicta in a footnote does state that without board resolution no
officer or agent has authority to bind the corporation in a real estate deal. In so doing Western
cites Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815, 818 (Utah 1975). Foster, also in dicta, states
the same but was discussing the specific issue of a corporate secretary not ordinarily having the
authority to bind a corporation where in that case the secretary had indicated the contract in
question required the signature of the corporate president and had actually left space for the
President to sign.
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Ill miiis (Msr the Articles of Organization named Jerez as the manager and stated that the
purpose of the LLC was to purchase and develop real property. Add « ;,h.,. w. ;i\;npus s
reliance o;; L ian • . •. *

'

' ' i5

"•

' matter of a LLC can bind the LLC

relative to property and Appellants' reliance on Western as authority that further due diligence
was required of Mt. Olympus is mistaken.
JEREZ ACTED WITHIN TlW, EXPRESS SCOPE OF THE LLC'S
BUSINESS THEREFORE MT. OLYMPUS HAD NO FURTHER BURDEN
TO ESTABLISH JEREZ'S AUTHORITY.
*-• •;>

-

. far as partnerships are concerned a lender must

verify the actual . •;• apparent authority of the signing partner Appellants cite Luddington v.
Bodenvest Lid. , v s . i .-•» - -

i

v. ...*.

L • •-• a

^:uni r :- :. :- -nisnlaced.

The portion of Luddington cited by Appellants also slant! foi the uka that one can rel\ apt-:
partner who acts \\ nhh the scope of the partnership )L,.>..iw> . ; . » • . .
Peterson v. Aini^uoni:

:L. I.UUUIJIL.JW», V. .U-S

" " ' .,f tah •'^'l* The Peterson Court stated:

The law is well settled that a partner without special authority, has
no power to bind the firm in any transaction which is without the
ordinary or apparent scope of the partnership business. Of this the
plaintiff was bound to take notice and, having entered into a
transaction with one partner, which was not, as clearly appears
from both the pleadings and proof, within such scope, and having
brought this suit to establish liability on the part of the other
partners, the burden was upon her to show either that the
contracting partner had special authority, or that the transaction
was afterwards ratified by the other partners who she seeks to hold
liable".
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This concept, that a partner acts as an agent of the partnership and the act ofevery
partner binds the pailnership including execution in the partnership name of any instrument for
apparently carrying on — *V '--'.'a! wav the business of the partnership has been codified in Utah
Code A nn. §4S-1 -fi

In the present case, Jerez was obtaining a loan from Mt. Olympus for the exact and
express purpose for which the LLC was organized, to "develop a parcel of real estate... located at
3664 East 7650 South, Salt Lake City, Utah." See Appendix "A," paragraph 8 and 9, and
Appendix "C," emphasis added. The stated purpose of this loan was clearly within the "ordinary
or apparent scope of the partnership business."
Even if partnership law were to apply, rather than the express language of Utah Code
Ann. §48-2b-127, under Peterson as cited in Luddington, Mt. Olympus has no burden as to the
partner's, in this case Jerez's, authority if the transaction was within the scope of the partnership.
In this case Jerez acted completely within the scope of the LLC's business12. Luddington,
Peterson, Utah Code Ann. §48-1-6, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 and the new Utah Code Ann.
§48-2c-802 all support Mt. Olympus.
Notwithstanding the above, Luddington says much more and can be further distinguished.
Most glaring, is that in Luddington the Certificate of Limited Partnership, a public document,
expressly limited the authority of the general partner. See Luddington at page 209. In this case,
the Articles of Organization, the LLC's public document, did not limit the authority of Jerez, the
LLC's manager.

12

Not only did Jerez act within the scope of the LLC's business, Mt. Olympus did not
bring suit to "establish liability on the part of the other partners," one of the burden shifting
elements of Peterson and therefore the burden was not upon Mt. Olympus.
14

C.

JEREZ HAD APP 4..RENT AUTHORITY TO BIND THE LLC WHERE
THE ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION NAMED HIM AS THE LLC'S
MANAGER, THE ARTICLES WERE A PUBLIC DOCUMENT, MT.
OLYMPUS BELIEVED JEREZ HAD AUTHORITY, UTAH CODE ANN
§48-2b-127 GAVE MT. OLYMPUS REASON TO BELIEVE JEREZ H \D
AUTHORITY, AND MT. OLYMPUS IIAD (HANGED ITS POSITION IN
REI ,1ANCE ON JEREZ'S AUTHORI1Y .

L u d a i i m i o - . »ii^- .i.v.>*>. • <

•* • • ' - ' • • - i v '

!

^:* ' . - i / : ' :••J apparent authority. 1 he

Court stated:
In order to show apparen: jh:;:.
- , r . i -:-e
established:
(1) that the principal has manifested his [or he: J conseni to ilv
exercise of such authority or has knowingly permitted the agent to
assume the exercise of such authority; (2) that the third person
'»' of the facts and, acting in good faith, had reason to believe,
:i
• • <:Ur believe, that the agent possessed such authority;
Jiird person, relying on such appearance o
authority, has changed his [or her] position and will be injured or
suffer loss if the act done or transaction executed by the agent does
no' bind the principle.
Luddington at page 209.
In the present case the LLC manifested its consent to Jerez cxercismi: ; i(

-—

:ei to further the express objective of the LLC to develop

property when it stated its purpose and named Jerez as its manager in the Arti.cl.es of
Organization,;.,

•

. * ^.-,

-^ *!•

' *i/iosui

Organization are a public document. Mt. Olympus evidently believed that Jerez had authority
because it executed the transaction anc ga\ c JCI^ -.

,.-;.».-

Jerez had the authority because the law at the time of the transaction, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b127 states:

1.5

(2) Instruments and documents providing for the mortgage...of
property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding
upon the limited liability company if they are executed by one or
more managers...
Lastly, Mt. Olympus, relying on the Articles of Organization and Utah Code Ann. §482b-127 changed its position by issuing a loan to the LLC for $25,000.00. Mt. Olympus will be
injured if the LLC is not bound by the acts of Jerez.
D.

EQUITY REQUIRES THAT IF THERE IS A CHOICE BETWEEN MT.
OLYMPUS OR APPELLANTS AS TO WHO SHOULD SUFFER
BECAUSE OF JEREZ'S ACTION IT SHOULD BE APPELLANTS
BECAUSE THEY CREATED THE CIRCUMSTANCES MAKING THE
LOSS POSSIBLE.

Luddington states that the doctrine of apparent authority has its roots in equitable estoppel
and that it is founded on the idea that where one of two persons must suffer from the wrong of a
third the loss should fall on that one whose conduct created the circumstances which made the
loss possible. See Luddington at page 209.
This matter cries out for such an application. Jerez was the Appellants' choice as a joint
venturer, a member of the LLC and the LLC's manager. The Appellants clothed him with
managerial authority. The Appellants sat in a room with Jerez while both the Articles of
Organization and the Operating Agreement were signed. They could have easily restricted his
authority in the Articles, the public document, so that third parties, like Mt. Olympus, would be
on notice of any restrictions. This they did not do and this is exactly what the new Utah Code
Ann. §48-2c-802 requires.. The Appellants relied upon Jerez. The Appellants know to whom
they must look for redress as they have alleged in their complaint that Jerez breached his
fiduciary duties to Appellants and converted the loan proceeds to his own use and that he failed
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to use reasonable and good judgment. Appellants failed to supervise Jerez or even watch their
investment. They failed to see that a mortgage was recorded or the very public process of the
foreclosure, hi short, they waited until Mt. Olympus would suffer the most before stepping
forward to finally police their partner, Jerez.
The burden of Jerez's bad character and bad acts must be borne by Appellants. This, of
course, is especially true where Jerez was acting within the express scope of the LLC's business,
the public document clothed him with managerial authority and the statutory scheme then and
now sustain Mt. Olympus's reliance13. Applying the agency analysis of the cases cited, Jerez
acted with apparent authority and Mt. Olympus had no further inquiry than that required by Utah
Code Ann. §48-2b-127.
III.

UNDER THE NEW STATUTE UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2c-802 JUDGE STIRBA'S
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT WOULD HAVE BEEN
EQUALLY CORRECT.
Appellants completely misstate Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802. Appellants state that this

section expressly limits the power of the manager "to only bind the company, even in real
property situations, only if they are allowed to do so by the Articles of Incorporation." See the
bottom of page '11' of Appellants' brief. This is absurd.
The statute reads in relevant part:
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a manager managed company

Luddington has at least one further distinguishing point. The general partner took the
loan in Luddington for his own purposes unrelated to the business of the partnership. As the
dissent stated, "imposing, defacto, an extraordinary high duty of inquiry on the Lender to police
the internal operations of a partnership that had the misfortune of having" a manager such as
Jerez, in this case, would be improper.
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(a) each manager is an agent of the company for the purpose of its
business;
(b) a member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its
business solely by reason of being a member;
(c) an act of a manger, including the signing of a document in the company
name, for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the company
business, or business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the
company unless the manager had no authority to act for the company in the
particular matter and the lack of authority was expressly described in the
articles of organization or the person with whom the manager was dealing
knew or otherwise had notice that the manager lack authority; and
(d) an act of a manager which is not apparently for carrying on in the
ordinary course of the company business, or business of the kind carried
on by the company, binds the company only if the act was authorized by
the members in accordance with Subsection 48-2c-803(2) or (3).
(3) Notwithstanding the provision of Subsections (1) and (2), unless the articles of
organization expressly limit their authority, any member in a member-managed
company, or any manager in a manger managed company, may sign,
acknowledge, and deliver any document transferring or affecting the company's
interest in real or personal property, and if the authority is not so limited, the
document shall be conclusive in favor of a person who gives value without
knowledge of the lack of authority of the person who signs and delivers the
document.
This statute could not be any clearer. It does not further limit the power of managers, as
argued by Appellants, it actually clarifies and expands the authority of managers. If the Articles
of Organization, a public document giving constructive notice to all who deal with the LLC, does
not expressly describe the lack of authority of a manager and the manager was apparently
carrying on in the ordinary course of the business then the company is bound. Utah Code Ann.
§48-2c-802(3) goes even further. "Unless the Articles of Organization expressly limit" the
manger's authority, the manager can do exactly what Jerez did in this case.

18

Under this new statutory scheme Judge Stirba would have been equally correct in
dismissing Appellants' complaint
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the foregoing, the Honorable Anne M. Striba's decision should be affirmed.
DATED this J\7

day of November, 2001.

ATKIN & HAWKINS, P.C.

Gregory P. H&wieins
Attorneys for Respondent
Mt Olympus Financial, LC
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NAMVAR TAGHIPOUR, and DANESH
RAHEMI, M.D., individuals and JEREZ,
TAGHIPOUR AND ASSOCIATES, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDGAR C JEREZ, an individual, and
MOUNT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Defendants.

COMPLAINT
JURY DEMAND
Civil No.:
Judge:

990JJCJ%3
#f/{?1

Plaintiffs Namvar Taghipour, Danesh Rahemi, M.D., and Jerez, Taghipour and
Associates* LX.C, complain of Defendants and for cause of action allege a$ follows:
FACTS
1. Namvar Taghipoxir ("Taghipouf 0 is and was at all times material hereto, a resident of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2. Dr. Danesh Rahemi ("Rahemi") is and was at all times material hereto, a resident of
the State of Massachusetts.
3. Edgar C. Jere& ("Jerez'*) is and was at all times material hereto, a resident of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
4. Jerez, Taghipour and Associates, LLC, ("the LC") is a Utah limited liability company

5. Mount Olympus Financial, L, C, ("Olympus'*) is a Utah limited liability company
with its principal plaoe of business at 330 South 300 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah
8411L
6. On August 30, 1994 Taghipour, Rahemi and Jerez formed the LC.
7. The initial registered office of the LC was 10 Exchange Place, Suite 309, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
8. The purpose of the LC was to purchase and develop a parcel of real estate under a
joint venture agreement.
9. The parcel of land that the LC wished to purchase was located at 3664 East 7650
South Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 ("the Property'5),
10. Membership and contributions in and to the LC were divided among six individuals;
Defendant Edgar C. Jerez, Plaintiffs Taghipour and Rahemi, Ksai Liang, Orlando Jerez
and Dean Becker.
1 h On August 31,1994 the owners of the Property conveyed the Property to the LC.
12. The Articles of Organization of the LC listed Defendant Edgar Jerez as the manager
oftheLC.
13. According to Section 3.4 of the Operating Agreement no loans were allowed to be
contracted on behalf of the LC without a resolution by the members.
14. The Operating Agreement prescribes that formal actions by members require a 51%
majority of the ownership interest
15. The Operating Agreement further provides that voting in the LC will to be in
accordance with the percentage of the member's equity ownership interest.
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16. On January 10,1997 without obtaining approval as required under the Operating
Agreement and without the knowledge or consent of the LC, Jerez unilaterally entered
into a loan agreement with Olympus ('the Olympus Loan**) wherefcy he gave Olympus a
Deed of Trust to the Property to secure a Trust Deed Note for $25,000.00.
17. Olympus disbursed to Jerez only $20^000 of the $25,000 Olympus Loan keeping
$5,000 as an origination fee., points or some otherfinancinginducement.
18. Jerez defaulted on the Olympus Loan.
19. The other LC members never received any notices of default or of the pending
foreclosure sale.
20. Plaintiffs continued to make payments on the promissory note to the underlying
landowners of the Property.
21. Olympus foreclosed on the Property.
22. Even after the Olympus foreclosure the Plaintiffs made a payment on the Property.
23. Only after the foreclosure sale did the Plaintiffs learn that the Property had been
mortgaged by Jerez to obtain the Olympus Loan.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Against Jerez: Accounting/Constructive Trust)
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 1 through 23.
24. Under the Operating Agreement of the LC Jerez agreed to account to Plaintiffs for all
monies collected and disbursed by him for the LC.
25. Jerez has collected at least $25,000 allegedly on behalf of the LC
26. An accounting is necessary to show the amount due to Plaintiffs from Jerez.
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27. A constructive trust should be placed on all assets of Jerez to recover to the Plaintiffs
all of the monies shown by the accounting to have been improperly dealt with by Jerez.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Against Jerez: Breach of Fiduciary Duties)
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 1 through 23.
28. As the managing member Jerez owed fiduciary duties to the LC.
29. Under the Articles of Organization and the Operating Agreement of the LC Jerez, as
the managing member, could not enter into a loan transaction unless agreed to by the
other members.
30. Jerez breached hisfiduciaryduties to the LC by entering into the Olympus Loan
without obtaining proper approvals and then converting the proceeds to his own personal
use.
31. Jerez further breached hisfiducuiaryduty by failing to give the Plaintiffs notice of his
actions so that they may cure the default.
3Z Jerez did not use reasonable care or good business judgement
33. As a direct and proximate result of Jerez' actions and inactions Plaintiffs have
sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial consisting of the following: loss
of the Property, money paid out to the underlying landowners, and interest that would
otherwise have accrued on Plaintiffs' accounts.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Against Olympus: Declaratory Judgment)
Plainttfis reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 23.
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34. Rights, dirties and obligations as members of a limited liability company are created
and limited under Utah law by the company's Articles of Organization and its Operating
Agreement
35. A dispute now exists between the Pkintiffe and Olympus as to the Olympus Loan and
foreclosure of the Property.
36. This action for declaratory judgment is brought under Section 78-33-1, et seq, Utah
Code Annotated
37. The Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment that the Olympus Loan and the
accompanying mortgage of the Property and subsequent foreclosure were invalid because
Olympus failed to determine that Jerez did uot have the power to take the actions that he
did under the Article and Operating Agreement of the LC
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Against Olympus: Negligence)
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 1 through 23.
38. Olympus owed a duty of which the Plaintiffs were beneficiaries to determine if Jerez
had the authority to execute the Olympus Loan.
39. The standard of care in thefinancingindustry requires such due diligence in part for
the benefit of innocent third-parties such as the Plaintiffs.
40. Olympus breached this duty and standard of care by failing to obtain verification of
the propriety of Jerez's entry into the Olympus Loan.
4 L Olympus failed to verify whether or not the managing member could mortgage the
corporate property to secure a debt.

42. On information and belief Olympus never inspected the Operating Agreement or
other documentation of the LC to determine whether Jerez had the authority to mortgage
the Property,
43. Olympus* reliance was not reasonable and breached its standard of care.
44. The standard of care would have required Olympus to have had written
documentation that Jerez had appropriate authority to execute the Olympus Loan and
mortgage the Property.
45. Olympus knew, or should have known that managing members of limited liability
companies do not always have the authority to unilaterally obtain loans and/or mortgage
company property.
46. The Olympus Loan violated Olympus's standard of care and duties to the Plaintiffs
and the LC.
47. As a direct and proximaie result of Olympus1 actions the Plaintiffs have sustained
damages in an amount to be determined at trial consisting of the following: loss of the
Property, money paid outtothe underlying landowners, and interest that would otherwise
have accrued on Plaintiffe5 accounts.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Against Olympus: Fartition)
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations
contained in Paragraphs l through 23.
48. Pursuant to Chapter 39 of Title 7X, U.C.A.. the Plaintiffs are entitled to a partition of
the various interests in the Property viv a vis Olympus.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Dissolution of L Q
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Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 23.
49- Pursuant to Section 48-2b-142(l)(a), (b) and (c), U.C.A., the Plaintiffe are entitled to
dissolution of the L.C and to an accounting and setdement of the assets of the L.C.
pursuant to Section 48-2b-138, U.CA.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Quiet Title)
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 23
50* Plaintiffs are entftled to have the title to die Property quieted in them as against
Olympus*
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request:
1. Judgment against Jerez on the First Claim for Relief for an accounting to Plaintiffs for
all money and property received on behalf of the LC by Jerez and the imposition of a
constructive trust on all such wrongfully appropriated monies;
2. Judgment against Jerez on the Second Claim for Relief for damages in an amount to
be determined at trial;
3. Judgment on the Third Claim for Relief declaring that the Trust Deed and Trust Deed
Note in favor of Olympus are void, and that Olympus has no interest in the Property as a
result of the foreclosure sale.
4. A declaration on the Third Claim for Relief that the Plaintiffs are the owners and
holders of the undivided interests in the Pproperty.

5. Judgment on the Fourth Claim for relief for damages against Olympus in an amount
to be determined at trial.
6. On their Sixth Claim for Relief for partition of the Property.
7. On the Sixtli Claim for Relief the Plaintiffs pray for a dissolution of die L.C. and for
an accounting and settlement of the assets of the LX. pursuant to Section 48-2b-138,
ULC.A.
8. On the Seventh Claim for relief for an order quieting title to the Property in the
Plaintiffs.
9. Any other relief that this Court considers proper.
JURYDEMAJfl)
The Plaintiffs request that issues triable before a jury be so heard,
DATED this / j l day of June, 1999.
BAIRD^jrai^aJ^.

^ ^

Bmc^^Baird
Att&aeys for the Plaintiffs

Addresses of the Plaintife:
Dr. Danesh Rahimi
60 Tanglewood Road
Newton, MA 02159

Nam! Taghiponr
4830 South Arbor Cr.
Holladay,UT841I7
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Namvar TAGHIPOUR and Danesh Rahemi,
M.D., individuals; and
Jerez, Taghipour, and Associates, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
Edgar C. JEREZ, an individual; and Mount
Olympus Financial,
L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 20000047-CA.
April 26, 2001.
Two members of limited-liability company (LLC)
and the LLC brought action against third member
and lender, seeking declaration that loan agreement
entered into by lender and third member was invalid,
claiming damages for lender's negligence, and
seeking partition of LLC property that secured loan.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
Anne M. Stirba, J., granted lender's motion to
dismiss. Two members and LLC appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Thome, J., held that: (1) third
member, as manager, had right to bind LLC to loan
agreement without vote by all members, and (2)
lender took all steps necessary to determine that
third member was manager.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., concurred and filed opinion.
[1] Appeal and Error <@^>863
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature
of Decision Appealed from
30k863 In General.
Propriety of a dismissal based on failure to state a
cause of action upon which relief may be granted is
a question of law; therefore the Court of Appeals
reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness. Rules

Page 1
Civ.Proc., Rule 12(b)(6).
[2] Appeal and Error ®^842(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) In General.
Court of Appeals reviews questions of statutory
interpretation for correctness, according no
deference to the trial court's conclusions.
[3] Appeal and Error <£=>842(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) In General.
The Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's
rulings of law for correctness.
[4] Statutes®^ 188
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 In General.
[See headnote text below]
[4] Statutes <@^212.6
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction
361k212.6 Words Used.
Rules of statutory construction require that a court
look first to the plain language of a statute and
assume that each term was used advisedly by the
legislature.
[5] Statutes <£=>223.4
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k223 Construction with Reference to Other
Statutes
361k223.4 General and Special Statutes.
A more specific statutory provision always takes
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precedence over a more general statutory provision.
[6] Corporations <®=?410
101 —
101X1 Corporate Powers and Liabilities
101XI(B) Representation of Corporation
Officers and Agents
101k410 Purchases, Sales, and Warranties.

by

(See headnote text below]
[6] Corporations <@^415
101 —
101X1 Corporate Powers and Liabilities
101XI(B) Representation of Corporation by
Officers and Agents
101k415 Bonds and Mortgages.
Manager has statutory authority to unilaterally bind
a limited-liability company (LLC) to instruments and
documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage,
or disposition of LLC property, even if LLC's
operating agreement requires ratification by
members' vote. U.C.A. 1953 §§ 48-2b-135(2)(b),
48-2b-127(2).
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101k425(5) Estoppel of Corporation by Acts or
Declarations.
Lender took the steps necessary to determine that
borrower was manager of limited-liability company
(LLC), such that LLC was bound by loan
agreement, although LLC's operating agreement
provided that no loan could be contracted on behalf
of the LLC without resolution approved by its
members, where lender correctly concluded that
borrower was manager, and lender was not required
by Limited Liability Act to inquire further about
operating agreement. U.C.A. 1953 § 48-2b-127(2).
[9] Appeal and Error <®=>169
30 —
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30kl69 Necessity of Presentation in General.
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial
court may not be raised on appeal.
Third District, Salt Lake Department.
The Honorable Anne M. Striba.

[7] Constitutional Law <®^70.1(4)
92 —
92III Distribution of Governmental Powers and
Functions
92111(B) Judicial Powers and Functions
92k70 Encroachment on Legislature
92k70.1 In General
92k70.1(4)
Determination
of
Facts;
Emergency or Public Interest.

Bruce R. Baird and Dean H. Becker, Salt Lake
City, for Appellants.
Blake S. Atkin and Jonathan Hawkins, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE.
OPINION

[See headnote text below]
THORNE, Judge:
[7] Constitutional Law <®=>81
92 —
92IV Police Power in General
92k81 Nature and Scope in General.
It is the power and responsibility of the legislature
to enact laws to promote the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of society, and the
Court of Appeals will not substitute its judgment for
that of the legislature with respect to what best
serves the public interest.
[8] Corporations <®^425(5)
101 —
101X1 Corporate Powers and Liabilities
101X1(B) Representation of Corporation by
Officers and Agents
101k425 Estoppel to Deny Authority or Acts in
General

**1 % 1 Plaintiffs Namvar Taghipour, Danesh
Rahemi, M.D., and Jerez, Taghipour and
Associates, LLC, appeal from an order dismissing
their claims against defendant Mt. Olympus
Financial, L.C. (Mt.Olympus). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
K 2 On August 30, 1994, Taghipour, Rahemi, and
co-defendant Edgar Jerez (Jerez) formed Jerez,
Taghipour and Associates, LLC (the LLC). The
group formed the LLC to purchase and develop a
parcel of real estate (the Property) under a joint
venture agreement.
The LLC's Articles of
Organization listed Jerez as a LLC member and a
manager, while its Operating Agreement provided
that no loan could be contracted on behalf of the
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LLC without a resolution approved by its members
U 3 On August 31, 1994, the LLC acquired the
Property On January 10, 1997, Jerez, unbeknownst
to the LLC's other members or managers,
unilaterally entered into a loan agreement for
$25,000 with Mt Olympus on behalf of the LLC
To secure the loan, Jerez executed and delivered a
trust deed on the Property to Mt Olympus
Subsequently, Mt Olympus dispersed $20,000 of
the funds to Jerez and kept the remaining $5,000 for
various fees Jerez apparently misappropriated the
$20,000 The LLC, unaware of the loan, ultimately
defaulted on it and Mt Olympus foreclosed on the
Property
11 4 On June 18, 1999, plaintiffs sued Mt Olympus
and Jerez, asserting claims against Mt Olympus for
(1) declaratory judgment, (2) negligence, and (3)
partition In response, Mt Olympus filed a motion
to dismiss The trial court granted Mt Olympus's
motion, ruling that pursuant to Utah Code Ann §
48-2b-127(2) (1998), the documents executed by
Jerez were bmdmg upon the LLC Plaintiffs timely
appealed
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] H 5 "The propriety of a dismissal based on Utah
R Civ P 12(b)(6) is a question of law, therefore
we review the [trial] court's ruling for correctness "
Stokes v Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94,H 6, 987 P 2d
602
[2] H 6 Plaintiffs argue the trial court's
interpretation of section 48-2b-127(2) was in error,
because a manager cannot unilaterally bind a limited
liability company when the company's operatmg
agreement or articles of organization require a
majority vote or a resolution before undertaking such
an act
We review questions of statutory
interpretation for correctness, according no
deference to the trial court's conclusions
See
Adkins v Uncle Bart's, Inc , 2000 UT 14,1) 11, 1
P 3d 528
[3] \ 1 Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred by
ruling, as a matter of law, that Mt Olympus had
taken the steps necessary to determme Jerez was a
LLC manager We review a trial court's rulings of
law for correctness See Munford v Lee Servicing
Co , 2000 UT App 108,H 10, 999 P 2d 23
H 8 Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by
dismissing their partition claim against Mt

Olympus
This also presents a question of law,
which we review for correctness See id.
ANALYSIS
A Statutory Interpretation of Utah Code Ann §
48-2b-127
**2 % 9 Plaintiffs argue the Mt Olympus loan
agreement, unilaterally executed by Jerez on behalf
of the LLC, is invalid because the LLC's Operating
Agreement requires membership approval before
such an undertaking Plaintiffs assert that section
48-2b-127(2), a Utah Limited Liability Act
provision, requires such a result
[4] [5] U 10 The rules of statutory construction
require that we look "first to the plain language of a
statute
and assumef ] that each term was used
advisedly by the [Legislature '
Biddle v
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,H 14, 993
P 2d 875 Further, "it is well settled that a more
specific
[statutory] provision always takes
precedence over a more general [statutory]
provision " State v Hinson, 966 P 2d 273, 277
(Utah Ct App 1998), see also Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 830 P 2d 233, 235 (Utah 1992)
[6] K 11 In the present matter, plaintiffs argue that
Utah Code Ann § 48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998) and Utah
Code Ann § 48-2b-127(2) (1998) should be read in
harmony, and therefore, section 48-2b-125(2)(b)'s
restrictions on manager authority should be
incorporated into section 48-2b-127(2) In pertinent
part, section 48-2b-125(2)(b) states
"If the
management of the limited liability company is
vested m a manager or managers, any manager has
authority to bind the limited liability company,
unless otherwise provided in the articles of
organization or operating agreement " Utah Code
Ann § 48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998) (emphasis added) In
contrast, section 48-2b-127(2) states "Instruments
and documents providmg for the acquisition,
mortgage, or disposition of property of the limited
liability company shall be valid and bindmg upon the
limited liability company if they are executed by one
or more managers " Id § 48-2b-127(2)
H 12 The plain language of section 48-2b-127(2)
provides no limitations on a manager's authority to
execute specified instruments and documents, and
thus, bind the limited liability company Further,
assuming, as we must, that "each term [m section
48-2b-127(2) ] was used advisedly by the
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[Legislature," Biddle, 993 P 2d 875, 1999 UT 110
at T| 14, we find no reason to suggest that had the
Legislature intended section 48-2b-127(2) to include
the same restrictions set rorth in section
48-2b-125(2)(b), the Legislature would ha\e omitted
those restrictions

acknowledge the Legislature's right to exercise its
judgment It is not for us to evaluate, as plaintiffs
would have us do, the wisdom of the Legislature's
choice m light of alternative courses of action
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's
interpretation of section 48-2b-127(2)

U 13 Additionally, plaintiffs' argument ignores the
well-established rule of construction that specific
statutory provisions prevail over general statutory
provisions See Hinson, 966 P 2d at 277 Section
48-2b-127(2) states, m no uncertain terms,
"[instruments and documents
shall be valid and
binding upon the limited liability company if they are
executed by one or more managers " Utah Code
Ann § 48-2b-127(2) (1998) ^(emphasis added)
Accordingly, the specific requirements of section
48-2b-127(2) must control over the general
application of section 48-2b-125(2)(b)'s restrictions

B Requirements
48-2b-127(2)

**3 [7] T| 14 Finally, we acknowledge plaintiffs'
concern that 'the documents listed in [section]
48-2b-127 have the greatest potential for damage to a
limited liability company because they are
encumbering the property of the limited liability
company " However, "[i]t is the power and
responsibility of the [Legislature to enact laws to
promote the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of society
and [we] will not
substitute our judgment for that of the [Legislature
with respect to what best serves the public mterest "
Bastion v King, 661 P 2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983), see
also Redwood Gym v Salt Lake County Comm'n,
624 P 2d 1138, 1141 (Utah 1981) (stating that "it is
not the function of [appellate] court[s] to evaluate the
wisdom or practical necessity of legislative
enactments"), State v Mason, 94 Utah 501, 509, 78
P 2d 920, 923 (1938) (statmg that the judiciary
"cannot supplant [the Legislature s] judgment" with
its own)
% 15 Furthermore, we can conceive of several
reasons why the Legislature might choose not to
expand the protections for stockholders of a limited
liability company in transactions lmolvmg the
mortgage of real property
These reasons may
include the need to facilitate transactions involving
the transfer of title to property and mortgages from
the ongmal parties to new parties, and the limited
access these new parties have to orgamc documents
not revealed in a title search
H 16 It is not necessary for our purpose, however,
that we identify a specific basis for the Legislature's
decision Rather, all that is required is that we

of

Utah

Code

Ann

§

[8] T| 17 Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred
b> ruling, as a matter of law, that Mt Olympus had
taken the steps uecessary to determme Jerez was a
LLC manager
Plaintiffs contend the loan
agreement was "invalid because [Mt ] Olympus
failed to determine that Jerez
did not have the
power to take the actions he did under the [LLC's]
Articles [of Organization] and Operating Agreement
Mt Olympus, however, correctly concluded that
Jerez was a manager of the LLC, and section
48 2b-127(2) requires nothing more Accordingly,
the trial court correctly determined that Mt
Olympus took the steps necessary to determme Jerez
was a manager of the LLC, and therefore, satisfied
the requirements of section 48-2b-127(2)
C Partition
[9] K 18 Fmaliy, plaintiffs argue the trial court
erred by dismissing their claim for partition After
reviewing the trial memoranda of both parties, the
trial court found section 48-2b-127(2) dispositive and
dismissed plaintiffs' claims
(FN1) Following
dismissal, the record in this matter lacks an objection
or any other attempt by plaintiffs to obtain a specific
ruling on their partition claim "As a general rule,
claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal " State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74,^
11, 10 P 3d 346 In addition, we note that plaintiffs'
failure to establish that Jerez lacked the authority to
bind the LLC also results in the failure of their
partition claim We therefore decline to reach the
merits of plaintiff :>' partition claim
**4. % 19 The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed
1 20 I CONCUR Judith M Billings, Judge
ORME, Judge (c oncurnng)
% 21 I concur in the court's opinion In so doing, I
must note that I find the policy reflected m sections
48-2b-125(2)(b) and -127(2) to be quite curious If,
as in this case, there are restrictions in a limited
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liability company's organic documents on its
managers* ability to unilaterally bind the company,
those restrictions will be effecme across the range
of mundane and comparatively insignificant
contracts purportedly entered into by the company,
but the restrictions will be ineffective m the case of
the company's most important contracts Thus, if
the articles of organization or operating agreement
provide that the managers will enter into no contract
without the approval of the company's members, as
memorialized in an appropriate resolution, the
company can escape an unauthorized contract tor
janitorial services, coffee supplies, or photocopying,
but is stuck with the sale of its property for less than
fair value or a loan on unfavorable terms
U 22 Surely this is at odds with the expectations of
the business community
A manager or officer
typically can bind the compam to comparatively
unimportant contracts, but, as is prouded in the
Operating Agreement m this case, needs member or
board approval to borrow against company assets
Financial institutions know this and are able to

Page 5
protect themselves by insisting on seeing articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and board resolutions-or the
limited liability company equivalents~as part of the
mortgage loan process A cursory review of such
documents m this case would have disclosed that
Jerez lacked the authority to bind the company to the
proposed loan agreement
H 23 In short, I suspect that the strange result in
this case is not so much the product of carefully
weighed policy considerations as it is the product of
a legislative oversight or lapse of some kind That
being said, I readily agree that the language of both
statutory sections is clear and unambiguous and that
it is not the prerogative of the courts to rewrite
legislation If the laws which dictate the result m
this case need to be fixed, the repairs must come via
legislative amendment
rather
than judicial
pronouncement
(FN1 ) The trial court ruled that "[t]he [Mt
Olympus loan] documents executed by Mr Jerez
are valid and binding on the [LLC] "
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urpose of Loan: Business.
planation of P u r a o s e : " ^ ^ ^ ^
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ed for Bankruptcy^
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.Filed When?_
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L V Fed or State Tax Liens:.
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~
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Loan # .
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alue of Property?
e
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jC<>mparables:„

AVe the undersigned hereby authorize Mt Olympus Financial, LC it's successors and/or assigns, to obtain any and all
nformation necessary pertaining to.the closing of this loan, including, but not limited to a Credit Report The Borrowers
jgree that if this loan is canceled by Borrowers for any reason, ALL costs and fees associated with the loan process must be
said by Borrowers before the Trust Deed will be reconveyed, including but not limited to, Broker fees, origination fees,
appraisal fees, title fees, processing fees, attorney's fees, etc. as shown on the closing statement. If Mt Olympus Financial, LC
zancels the loan because of untrue information or misrepresentations provided by Borrowers, Borrowers will be responsible
for costs and f^s as stated above. If Mt Olympus Financial, LC cancels for any other reason, Borrowers will not be
responsible for costs or fees.
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